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PUBLIC TRUST, RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND AQUACULTURE: A STORM
BREWING IN THE OCEAN STATE
JOSE L. FERNANDEZ
INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that the heart of "The Ocean State" is a bay,
Narragansett Bay. This magnificent harbor accounts for a significant portion
of the 400 miles of coastline that earn the state its nickname. The Bay's
enjoyment, however, is shared by multiple users giving rise to competing and
often conflicting demands on the limited physical resources that make up the
Bay. While the need to balance the demands on the Bay is not new, recent
events have adjusted the needs and rights of the various users of the Bay,
raising the prospect of a new allocation of resources.
Controversy has been generated by recent decisions of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court which redefined the relation between riparian owners'
rights and public rights under the public trust doctrine. Concurrently, the
depletion of the finfish and shellfish stock in the Northeast has resulted in a
clamor for the reintroduction of fish farming, aquaculture, to the waters of the
state. In turn, the possibility of increased aquaculture provokes a reaction
from fishermen who see it as limiting the fishing grounds and reducing the
price of the harvest.
This article reviews the common law on riparian rights and public
trust rights. It traces these doctrines from their English roots to their arrival
at our shores during colonial times. It notes that the public trust doctrine's
* Jose L. Fernandez is an Associate Professor at the Roger Williams University School of
Law. He holds an A.A. from Thomas Edison University (1980); a B.A. in legal technology
from Thomas Edison University (1982); and a J.D. from Rutgers Law School at Camden
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flexibility makes it useful today despite the exaggerated news of its demise.'
The exploration continues with an analysis of the doctrines as they have
evolved in Rhode Island from the earliest cases to the most recent decisions.
The probe entails a scan of aquaculture as practiced in the state since colonial
times and the legal decisions resolving difficulties that evolved during its
history. The article examines the effect that a possible reallocation of rights
among the users of the Bay is likely to have on the vitality of efforts to
expand aquaculture in Rhode Island. The piece also explores the paths open
to developing law and the economic and political reasons that make some
directions appealing. This article cautions on the perils inherent in some
choices, including the potential for the alienation of the bay bottom to private
owners, thereby, dissipating a public resource on which depend the exercise
of historical rights.
Finally, the article investigates decisions in other jurisdictions that
have balanced the need to allow the productive use of public lands while
protecting the public resource. In conclusion, the author posits that Rhode
Island's interest will be best served by limiting the application of recent
decisions that seem to expand the rights of riparian owners at the expense of
the common law rights of fishery and navigation. In addition, the article calls
for legislative action to provide for long, conditional leases of the bay bottom
to encourage the influx of capital required to make aquaculture a success.
I. AQUACULTURE
"The unthinkable has come to pass: The wealth of oceans, once
inexhaustible, has proven finite, and fish, once dubbed 'the poor man's
protein,' have become a resource coveted-and fought over-by nations."2
Thus starts the article detailing the incredible depletion of the ocean's supply
See, e.g., Marc Hershman, A Word of Caution: The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal
Zone Management, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 237 (1993); Note, The Public Trust Doctrine:
A Tool for Abuse in the Hands of Local Governments?, 20 STETSON L. REV. 929 (1991).
Compare Helen Ingram & Cy R. Oggins, The Public Trust Doctrine and Community Values
in Water, 32 NAT. RES. J. 515 (1992) with Tim Eichenberg & Barbara Vestal, Improving the
Legal Framework for Marine Aquaculture: The Role of Water Quality and the Public Trust
Doctrine, 2 TERR. SEA J. 340 (1992) (explaining some of the rebirth of the doctrine in recent
years).
2 Michael Parfit, Diminishing Returns: Exploiting the Ocean's Bounty, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 1995, at 2.
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by over-fishing and pollution. Michael Parfit documents the resulting
economic disruption that is taking place in a seventy billion dollar worldwide
industry that directly employs more than thirteen million workers as either
fishermen or as crews on fishing boats.' New England's harvest of fish has
not been exempt from this crisis. The catch has dropped from 1.6 billion
pounds in 1965 to less than 100 million in 1991.' The once plentiful
Georges Banks fishery is facing cutbacks as the fish supply dwindles.
The federal government has been compelled to advocate a policy that
encourages the growth of aquaculture and the preservation of marine
resources,' while instituting "buy-out" programs to acquire and destroy part
of the fishing fleet.6 Accordingly, Congress has provided for technical
assistance and loans to both public and private fish-farming efforts.7 The
response to federal encouragement and the drop in wild harvest has been a
steady increase in fish harvest from 6.66 million metric tons in 1984 to 12.68
million metric tons in 1991,' creating a market valued in the billions. 9 In the
northeastern part of the United States alone, the 1992 value was set at 146.4
million."° Rhode Island's participation in this increasing market, however,
has been limited to five private leases for producing shellfish (oysters,
Id. at 9.
4 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, RHODE ISLAND DEP'T OF ADMIN., COMMERCIAL
FISHERIES ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT STRATEGY, FINAL REPORT, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
PLANNING (Apr. 24, 1995).
1 See National Aquaculture Policy, Planning and Development Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. § §
2801-2810 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
6 See NOAA Readies $25 Million Vessel Buyout Plan, COMMERCIAL FISHERIES NEWS,
Mar. 1996, at 12B.
7 Section 1001 of the Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to cooperate at federal
and state levels to develop such plans and assist in carrying them out by providing loans,
conducting surveys, exploring methodology and disseminating information. 16 U.S.C. §
1001. See also 7 C.F.R. § 2.30; 7 U.S.C. §§ 3321-3324. For loans, see Federal Ship
Mortgage Insurance Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1271 (guaranteeing loans for the purchase of a "fishery
facility," including loans for the purchase of land, equipment or ships necessary for the
industry); 7 U.S.C. § 1921 (loans to "fishfarmers"); Aid to Small Business Act 15 U.S.C. §§
631-632. The protection provided by Congress includes harvest insurance for aquacultural
endeavors. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1508.
' JAMES L. ANDERSON & MARK T. SPATZ, RHODE ISLAND DEP'T OF ADMIN., WHITE
PAPER-AQUACULTURE: AN ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS IN RHODE
ISLAND (1994) [hereinafter ANDERSON & SPATZ].
' The market was valued at $28.4 billion in 1991. Id. at 4.
10 Id. at 8.
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scallops, and quahogs)," and four freshwater fish hatcheries. 2 Yet, the
State's history of fishfarming prior to the 1940s was otherwise.
By 1864, Rhode Island had adopted a program to grant private leases
of portions of the Narragansett Bay bottom for the cultivation of shellfish. 1 3
Early Rhode Island cases explored the troubled border between these rights.
As far back as 1822 a charter had been granted for the exclusive use of
submerged public lands in the Providence River for the purpose of cultivating
oysters. 14 The charter, however, was limited in that it required permission
from the owner of the adjacent shore and guaranteed the shore owner's right
to build wharfs. 5 A similar charter was issued to Ephraim Gifford in 1821
to plant a bed of oysters in Mount Hope Bay.' 6
By 1912, approximately 21,000 acres of Narragansett Bay bottom
were leased for shellfish farming.' This extensive development of
aquaculture, however, was not without its detractors. Because of claimed
abuses by the leaseholders, by the late 1920s, opposition by "free fishermen"
" Id. at 12.
12 Id.
"3 See State v. Cozzens, 2. R.I. 561 (1850) (involving two leases granted in 1822 and 1827
for exclusive-right oyster aquaculture). New England Oyster Co. v. McGarvey, 12 R.I. 385
(1879), illustrates the existence of aquaculture in the 1870s. The case involved the right of
a Rhode Island citizen to sell his ability to obtain a state lease to raise oysters. This
particular defendant had acted as a strawman for Massachusetts' business associates and
took the state lease in his name but at the expense of the out-of-state partners. Id. at 385.
At issue was the right of the citizen to join with non-citizens in a shellfishery effort under
a Rhode Island lease. After ruling that interests in a Rhode Island leased shellfishery could
indeed be sold to out-of-state partners, the court explained that
[t]he legislation on the subject is contained in Gen. Stat. R.I.... cap 133.
... [which] relates to private and several oyster fisheries. It authorizes the
shell-fish commissioners to lease, in the name of the State, to any person,
being an inhabitant in the State, any piece of land within the State,
covered by tide-water at low tide, and not within any harbor line, to be
used as a private and several oyster fishery.
Id. at 389-90.
'4 Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 77 A. 145, 156 (R.I. 1910).
Is ld. at 157.
16 Id.
"7 See STEPHEN OLSEN ET AL., COASTAL RESOURCES CTR., UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND,
AN INTERPRETIVE ATLAS OF NARRAGANSETT BAY (1980).
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was strong enough to become a serious political issue in the state.'8 Today,
the possibility of conflict persists. In part this is due to the friction between
those that would farm for fish and those who see themselves as "free
fishermen."' 9  Those who exercise the right of free fishery argue that
aquaculture conflicts with the public's right of navigation and fishery2" and
may drive down the value of the harvest.
Political conflicts arising from a clash of these rights alone, however,
did not cause the downfall of the industry to present levels-it took a
hurricane to do so. The 1938 hurricane moved tons of sediment onto the
existing aquaculture shellfish beds, destroying many of them. After the
hurricane destroyed the submerged beds, the leaseholders continued to
harvest shellfish without replanting, in effect, reverting to a fishery dependant
on free-occurring shellfish rather than cultivation.2' Ultimately, most of the
leaseholders either gave up or had their leases revoked. The effect is that
aquaculture in Rhode Island suffers by comparison to the efforts of
S See Shell Fish Board's Action is Defended, PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 4, 1930, at 18. The
article reports on a Republican rally at East Greenwich where the clerk of the Shell Fish
Commission defended the granting of leases for aquaculture in Narragansett Bay. The
article notes that the rally was attended by "[1]arge delegations of both shell and fin
fishermen ......
Mr. Smith declared the Shell Fish Commissioners were supported by law
to lease grounds in the State waters and that before any such lease had
ever been given the petition was duly advertised so that persons desiring
to remonstrate could do so. He challenged a statement made at a recent
Democratic rally by Theodore Francis Green that if elected Governor he
would proceed to open up the waters of the State to the free fishermen.
He pointed out that the commissioners had always tried to protect the
fishermen, referring to the steps taken to prevent the closing of
Narragansett Bay by the United States Public Health Service because it
was believed to have provided indirect cause of the typhoid epidemic in
Chicago and other western cities.
Id.
19 See Letters, BRISTOL PHOENIX, Mar. 21, 1996, at 6.
20 See Daniel A. Curran, Defining the Legal Framework in Aquaculture in Rhode Island
(Jan. 22, 1996) (testimony before the Rhode Island Legislative Commission on aquaculture):
"Potential conflicts exist among an ever larger user group. This group includes coastal land
owners, boaters, environmental groups and others concerned with navigation in the
Narragansett Bay." Id. at 2.
21 SeeOLSEN, supra note 17.
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neighboring states despite having significantly more coastline. 22
In addition to the historic basis for dissension, there are characteristics
peculiar to fishfarming operations that are likely to be new sources of
contention. Aquaculture beds require shallow water, thus the enterprise also
has the potential to interfere with riparian owners' ability to benefit from the
shore and to erect structures on the submerged flats. Finally, while some
view aquaculture operations as picturesque or quaint, to many waterside
owners it represents a blotch on the water view that initially attracted them
to the shore. The extent to which the competing uses will impinge on each
other will, of course, depend on the courts' distribution of rights.
II. RIPARIAN RIGHTS-THE SHORE AND TIDELANDS
The shoreline and submerged flats are the crucible where rights of
common law origin join in amalgamation of legal doctrine. These rights
include the Crown or state's right to alienate the property, the right to the
benefits that wash upon the shoreline, the right to wharf-out and access, and
the public trust rights of fishery and navigation.
It is axiomatic that under the common law the ownership of the
tidelands and submerged flats was with the Crown.23 However, the power to
use and alienate such lands was determined in part by the interplay of public
and private interests, thejus publicum andjus privatum. The effect was that
the Crown's ability to make grants of this property for private uses was
limited by particular rights of the public that could not be conveyed away.
These public rights included the rights of navigation and fishery.24 The
22 In 1994, Connecticut grossed $60 million from aquaculture-close to 200 times Rhode
Island's production for the same period. Also, Maine grossed $43 million and
Massachusetts $8 million. See ANDERSON & SPATZ, supra note 8, at 10.
23 "It is established that the right of property in all the soil which is covered by tide water,
and in also a part of the nation's territory, is primafacie in the Crown by the common law."
JOHN M. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS 17 (3d ed. 1900) (citing to Reg. v.
Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63; Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-Am. Tel. Co., 2 App. Cas. 394).
24 According to the treatise De Jure Maris, commonly ascribed to Lord
Hale, and other authorities of the seventeenth century, which refer to early
precedents, the Crown's interest in navigable waters is of a two-fold
nature: First, thejus publicum, a right of jurisdiction and control for the
benefit of its subjects, which is similar to the jurisdiction over public
highways on land . . . second, the jus privatum, or right of private
property, which is subject to thejus publicum, and which cannot be used
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source of the right of navigation pre-dates the Magna Carta where it was
made one of the comer stones of English law.25 Thus, the Crown had the
right to control the tidelands and regulate the dispersement of benefits
obtained from wrecks or other wealth such as seaweed and amber that came
upon the shore. In addition, the Crown could transfer thejus privatum in the
shore to a private party; however, such transfer did not give the private owner
a right superior to the public's right of navigation and fishery. The right of
navigation has been considered the superior of the two fundamental public
trust rights.26 In the United States, the state legislatures hold both jus
publicum andjus privatum; thus, interference with the right of navigation by
obstructing or limiting a channel may only be done with legislative leave.27
However, the right to navigate does not give license for wanton or malicious
interference with the right of fishery and must be reasonably exercised.28
Under common law, a riparian owner's rights included inter alia: the
right to the water in its natural state (or close to it); the right of access to the
water; the right to accretions on the land; the right to use the shore to draw
nets; the right to wharf-out (subject to some restrictions for navigation); and
the right to use the water adjacent to the property to conduct business.29 The
public's exercise of common law rights along the same shores has provided
the Rhode Island courts with opportunities to expound on the public trust
doctrine as it relates to the rights of fishery and navigation and incidental
privileges when counterpoised with riparian rights.
A. Land created by accretion
Under the common law, whether accretion of land along the shore
by the Crown or conveyed to a subject discharged of his public trust, or
so as to justify any interference with the public rights of navigation and
fishery.
Id. at 35-36.
25 Magna Carta Ch. 23; see also Rex v. Clark, 12 Mod. 615 (1702) (holding that
interference with the right of navigation is violative of the Magna Carta).
26 Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q.B. 339 (1846); Post v. Munn, 4 N.J.L. 68 (1818); Flanagan
v. Phila., 42 Pa. 219, 228 (1862); Moulton v. Libbed, 37 Me. 472 (1854).
27 GOULD, supra note 23, at 167.
28 Post, supra note 26.
29 See 1. FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 62 (1904). For a case illustrating the
conflict of riparian and public trust rights, see Capune v. Robbins, 160 S.E.2d 881 (N.C.
1968).
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belongs to the upland owner or the state depends on how the land was built
up. For example, land that was created by accretion was considered to
belong to the adjacent riparian estate if the change was slow and
imperceptible. 3' The right to the shore itself, the strip between the high and
low water marks, however, remained with the state.3' The land gained could
not be the result of an act by the landowner that constituted a nuisance.
Accordingly, land created by silting caused by an unauthorized wharf would
not belong to the landowner unless there was a supportable claim of adverse
possession.32 However, if the state upon digging a channel deposited the fill
upon the shore, the land so created was generally considered as owned by the
landowner.33
B. The Right to Wharf-Out
While historically the riparian owner may have had the right to wharf-
out, if the structure interfered with the public rights of fishery or navigation,
it was considered a public nuisance. It is noteworthy that the right to wharf-
out, whether or not interfering with a public right, was dependant on who
owned the soil upon which the wharf was erected.34 Therefore, if the Crown
owned the flats, the common law would have considered such an
encroachment by the riparian owner a prepresture and the wharf would be
subject to seizure by the Crown.35 A wharf would be safe from outside
claims, either as prepresture or nuisance, only if the title to the flats had been
granted by the Crown and Parliament and if the structure did not create a
public nuisance.
In the United States, the riparian owner has been granted the privilege
of using the tide flats to erect structures without having title to the flats. Such
a privilege has been limited, however, in that the public must still retain the
full enjoyment of the rights held in common: fishery, navigation, and those
31 See Jeffries v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890); Rex v. Yarborough, 3 B. &
C. 91 (1826); New Orleans v. U.S., 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836).
31 Camden Land Co. v. Lippincatt, 45 N.J.L. 405 (1836); Mulvey v. Norton, 100 N.Y. 424
(1885).
32 Tracy v. Norwich R.R., 39 Conn. 382 (1872). GOULD, supra note 23, at 310.
13 Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102 (1862). See also GOULD, supra note 23, at 312.
34 GOULD, supra note 23, at 330.
" Id. at 331 n.1.
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new public rights that have been developed in each state such as recreation.36
The Massachusetts Colony Ordinance of 1641-7 became the basis for early
colonial and subsequent state law in this field." The 1647 ordinance gave
title to the flats to the owner of adjoining uplands. Limited to an ebb of one
hundred rods, this grant was not merely an easement or license, but rather
conveyed full title in the flats subject to specific limitations.3" The title
granted was enough to maintain an action for trespass on the flats by the
riparian owner.39 The grant of title, however, contained the proviso that the
owner was not granted the power to interfere with navigation. ° This colonial
approach was later adopted by the New England littoral states after the
Revolution.4
Thus, under early American law, until the flats were filled, the public
retained the right to navigate over them 42 and to fish in them for finfish and
shellfish.43 However, there was basis for confusion. The riparian owner,
while prohibited from unreasonably interfering with navigation, was allowed
to build wharves to the low water mark unless prohibited by the legislature.44
Similarly, the owner could erect fish traps and stakes that would impede
fishing by the public.45 Different states adopted modified versions of the law
of ownership of the flats making matters even more complex. In
Connecticut, based on usage, the title of the flats extends only to the high
water mark, yet the riparian owner may extend wharves beyond the high
36 Id. See Providence Steam Engine Co. v. Providence S. Co., 12 R.I. 348 (1879); Stevens
v. Paterson R.R., 34 N.J.L. 532 (1870).
3' The relevant date when dealing with flats is 1647. See Forest River Lead Co. v. Salem,
165 Mass. 193, 201 (1896); see also GOULD, supra note 23, at 332 n.5
31 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 70-81 (1851); Storer v. Freeman, 6
Mass. 435 (1810); Austin v. Carter, 1 Mass. 231 (1804).
3' Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg. Co., 141 Mass. 51 (1886). In Massachusetts, title extended
to the level of the low tide. See Gray v. Bartlett, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 186 (1838); Boston
Mill v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467 (1832).
40 GOULD, supra note 23, at 333.
'1 Shively v. Bowlbly, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
42 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Reed, 69 Me. 510 (1879); Boston Steamboat Co. v. Munson,
117 Mass. 34 (1875); State v. Wilton, 49 Me. 9 (1860);
"3 See Packer v. Ryder, 144 Mass. 440 (1887); Proctor v. Wells, 103 Mass. 216 (1869).
41 See Packer, 144 Mass. at 440; Proctor, 103 Mass. at 206.
"5 See Matthews v. Treat, 75 Me. 594 (1887); Locke v. Motley, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 265
(1854); Low v. Knowlton, 26 Me. 128 (1846).
1996]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
water mark unless prohibited by the legislature.46 In New Jersey, similar
rights are given to the riparian owner, however, the owner also enjoys a
license to fill to the low water mark or to wharf-out unless it interferes with
navigation.47
In Rhode Island, as in Massachusetts, the right to build structures out
on the flats and to wharf-out provided there is no interference with navigation
is credited to the unpublished ordinance of 1707.4" To a great extent, the
focus of our exploration is determining whether in Rhode Island there is a
right to use the flats to the exclusion of the public or whether a license must
be obtained from the legislature. Also at issue is what happens when that
privilege is exercised to interfere with the navigation or fishery rights of the
public and to what extent an aquaculture or riparian owner's rights conflict
with both the rights to use the flats and the public's right to navigate and fish
the flats. At issue is the scope of public rights and the incidental entitlement
that may be needed to make use of those rights. If the public trust rights
attach to the flooded flats, what theory can be distilled from state case law to
determine when a public right may be extinguished by granting a private
party either a title or a license to exclude the public from heretofore public
property?
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The doctrine49 descended to our country from the British Crown
through the Colonial Charters, the Revolution, and the formation of the
46 Ockerhausen v. Tyson, 40 A. 1041 (Conn. 1899); New York R.R. v. Long, 43 A. 559
(Conn. 1899); Mather v. Chapman, 40 Conn. 382 (1873).
17 Stevens v. Paterson R.R., 34 N.J.L. 532 (1870); Bell v. Gough, 21 N.J.L. 156 (1847).
41 See ANGEL ON TIDE WATERS 237 (2d ed.). See also Murphy v. Bullock, 37 A. 348, 349
(R.I. 1897); State v. Burdick, 15 R.I. 239 (1886); Folsom v. Freeborn, 13 R.I. 200, 204
(1881); Brown v. Goddard, 13 R.I. 76 (1880); Providence Steam Engine Co. v. Providence
S. Co., 12 R.I. 348, 363 (1879); Thorton v. Grant, 10 R.I. 477 (1873); Clark v. Peckham, 10
R.I. 35, 38 (1871).
49 The public trust doctrine generally imposes an obligation on the sovereign to maintain
certain natural resources such as shoreline and parks available to the public for the exercise
of historically recognized rights such as fishing and navigation. See Joseph L. Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 471 (1970); Charles Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the
Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989); STUART MOORE, HISTORY OF THE
FORESHORE 318, 370, 413 (3d ed. 1988).
[Vol. 20:293
PUBLIC TRUST, RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND AQUACULTURE
states." Its original application, as applied to lands under navigable waters
in the United States, was stated in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois."
In that case, Justice Field explained that by common law the state holds title
to the soils under the tides and lands under navigable waters in trust for the
public. The title "necessarily carries with it control over the waters above
them... "52 This title, however, "is a title held in trust for the people of the
State, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties."53 The court explained that the state's control
may not be alienated to private parties except where control over a particular
parcel is given away to advance the public interest or when such a grant does
not substantially diminish the public's benefit in the remaining lands and
waters.
54
The concept that the rights of the state are subordinate to some rights
of the public when dealing with tidal flats or other public trust property has
ancient roots.5 It was understood since before the Magna Carta that the
people's rights of navigation and fishery imposed a burden on the Crown's
jusprivatum6 These rights extended to those incidental privileges that were
5' The history of the adoption of the doctrine is detailed in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1(1894).
51 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The case applied the public trust doctrine to affirm the circuit
court's decision declaring invalid an 1869 Illinois statute that attempted to grant the railroad
title to all the submerged lands in the Chicago Harbor.
52 Id. at 452.
" Id. See, e.g., Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 363, cert.
denied469 U.S. 821 (N.J. 1984); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (1971); Swan Island
Club v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95, 103-05 (E.D.N.C. 1953); White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446,
449 (1939); Arnold v. Muddy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
5' Justice Field stated:
The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the
public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment
of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.
Illinois Central R.R., 146 U.S. at 453.
" See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 545 (1823); GOULD, supra note 23,
at 41-42 (citing to Bacon, Hale and Hargrove's law tracts; 33 STANLEY HARDINGE &
QUINTON HOGG, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (1984); R. HALL, ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA SHORE OF THE REALM 4
(2d ed. 1985); Sax, supra note 49, at 475.
56 GOULD, supra note 23, at 42.
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necessary for the public enjoyment of a right. Thus, the privilege of
anchorage was considered necessary for the full enjoyment of the right to
navigate.57 The Supreme Court has extended this doctrine as adopted in this
country by the states to all navigable waters. 8 However, each state may
modify its exercise of the doctrine as to the waters over the lands it controls.59
The result is that the case law of each state will define the parameters of the
state's ability to alienate public trust property with the concomitant result of
possibly extinguishing the public rights that require a particular resource. As
Professor Sax explained, "Unfortunately, the case law has not developed in
any way that permits confident assertions about the outer limits of state
power."6
There is a distinction between public trust rights and "public trust
property"'" upon which public trust rights may be exercised. In addition,
there is an important connection between public trust rights and the
limitations placed on alienation of public property by the state. Without
" See Gann v. Whistable, Free Fishers, 11 H.L. Cas. 190 (1865); Colchester v. Brooke,
7 Q.B. 339 (1846). These incidental privileges included the right to disturb the bottom to
reach shellfish. ,See Proctor v. Wells, 103 Mass. 217 (1869); Coolidge v. Williams, 4 Mass.
140 (1808).
It is interesting to note that the Crown's jus privatum has not always been
uncontroverted. Gould cites to several cases that, in addition to repudiating Lord Hale's
support for the proposition, argue that historically, the owner of the manor adjacent to the
water owned the shore, the strip between high and low water, and was entitled to any goods
that were upon the shore. In the American colonies and subsequent states, the arguments
against ajus privatum have carried the day with the states recognizing the rights of the
riparian owner below the high water mark to many benefits from the shore such as seaweed
and beach-stuff. The English common law, on the other hand, generally accepted the view
that the Crown held all rights to the shore as "a trustee for the public, and cannot, since
Magna Carta, convey it to a subject." GOULD, supra note 23, at 38. See also Clement v.
Bums, 43 N.H. 609, 616 (1862); Weston v. Sampson, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 347, 352 (1852);
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 89-94 (1851); Bell v. Gough, 23 N.J.L.
624, 684, 688 (1847); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 367, 410 (1842); Baker v.
Bates, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 255, 259 (1831).
58 See Propeller Genessee Chiefv. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457-58 (1851).
s" See Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65 (1873) (explaining that states
have title to lands below tidal and navigable waters with the consequent right to use or
dispose of any portion thereof with the caveat that such alienation must be done without
serious impairment of the rights of the public in such waters). See also Pollard's Lesee v.
Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 220 (1845).
60 Sax, supra note 49, at 486.
67 See id at 478.
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preserving the public lands and sea resource, it is impossible to protect the
public right. However, separate issues arise: first, whether there are limits
on the administration and disposition of public property subject to the
exercise of public trust rights; second, whether the above limitations are
different from any other limitations that may apply to the disposition of other
public property and third, whether a legislature may impose restraints on the
exercise of public trust rights by limiting the resource on which the right is
dependant or by any other means, such as a prohibition on fishing or failure
to control pollution that destroys the resource.
IV. RHODE ISLAND'S CASE LAW
For purposes of discussion, it is helpful to separate the State's case
law into a group of early cases and a group of modern cases.
A. The Early Cases
Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co.62 may be the first recorded
conflict between polluting industries and aquaculture interests in Rhode
Island. The case illustrates how the use of a license rather than a fee simple
transfer allows the State the needed control over the resource while
guaranteeing the investors' and public's rights. The action was for trespass
causing injury "to their oysters and quahaugs,"'63 due to defendant's polluting
upper Narragansett Bay by dumping inter alia oil and tar into the Providence
River.64 Plaintiffs had been engaged in aquaculture since 1901 on twenty-
eight acres of submerged lands in the Bay. After 1903, the submerged land
was held by plaintiffs under a lease from the State for the specific purpose of
raising and farming shellfish.65 According to the claim, defendant's
pollutants rendered 40,000 bushels of plaintiff's shellfish unfit for market.66
Defendant responded by challenging the plaintiffs' ownership of the shellfish,
attacking the validity of the leases under which plaintiffs were able to claim
62 77 A. 145 (R.I. 1910).
63 Id. at 146.
64 Id.
61 Id. at 147.
66 Id.
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ownership to the product of a specific area of submerged land.67
The challenge to ownership of the shellfish was based on the fact that
in twenty of the twenty-eight acres of the leased submerged land the shellfish
occurred naturally. Defendants asserted that the state lease could not give
plaintiffs ownership rights over the naturally occurring shellfish because
these shellfish were held in common by the public under the public trust
doctrine. 68 The court first noted that Rhode Island law has established that
the property right conveyed by the State in such public trust property "is
merely a license which may be revoked at the pleasure of the legislature and
which ceases with the use of the land for that purpose.... [s]ubject, however,
to the public's right of navigation and of fishery. '69 The court went further
to state that, if the shellfisheries interfered with such public trust use, "the
oysters or clams, etc., may be removed as a nuisance. '"70
The court traced the development in Rhode Island of public trust law
noting that since the Magna Carta, the Crown and Parliament joint action was
needed to grant "an exclusive or several right of fishery."71 When the Crown
granted the colonial charters it did not have the power to create such
exclusive rights. In addition, the colonial government "from the date of the
granting of the charter July 8, 1663 to the time of the Revolution, 1776...
or to the date of the acknowledgment of our independence by the British
government, ' 72 also lacked the power to create exclusive use licenses on
public waters.73 However, with the Revolution the people of Rhode Island
"succeeded to all public rights of British subjects, whether originally
67 Id. at 149. Originally, the leases had been awarded by the shellfisheries commissioner.
Defendants challenged the authority to originally grant such leases and Chapter 1574, of the
Public Laws, Jan. 1908, an act that purported "to cure any defects" in the granting of the
leases. Id. at 148.
61 Id. at 152.
69 Id. at 152-53.
70 Id. at 153 (citing 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 998). As to the leases,
the court noted an axiom that the license it creates is not renewable as of right. The court
also addressed the possibility of a conflict between Chapter 853 of the Public Laws and R.I.
CONST. art. 1, § 17. This constitutional provision codifies the public trust doctrine in Rhode
Island: "[T]he people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery, and
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belonging.., to the Crown, or exercised and administered by Parliament. 74
To decide on the constitutionality of Law 853, under article 1, section
17 of the Rhode Island Constitution, the court reviewed the earlier decision
of State v. Cozzens75 in 1850. The case involved an appeal from a guilty
verdict under Rhode Island's "act for the preservation of oysters and other
shell-fish in this state." The defendant was found to have stolen oysters in
the value of forty dollars from a private oyster bed in Narragansett Bay.76 On
appeal, Cozzens contended that the shellfisheries act was in violation of the
Rhode Island Constitution provision stating that "the people shall continue
to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery and the privileges of the
shore to which they have been heretofore entitled under the charter and
usages of this state. 7 Under the statute, administrative officials were vested
with the authority to decide whether "old oyster beds" would provide a
greater public advantage if used as a private bed under a state lease rather
than "as a free and common oyster fishery. 78 The public benefit that would
result from granting private leases would be the encouragement to private
interests to plant and cultivate oysters making them more abundant.79
Despite the constitutional provision, the fact that the oyster bed had
traditionally been open to quahog fishing did not protect Cozzens.8' The
court avoided exploring whether the Oyster Shell-fishery Act conflicted with
other "rights of fishery and the privileges to the shore" guaranteed under
Rhode Island Constitution, article 1, section 17. A challenge that was
squarely placed by the defendant under exception number 5 on appeal.8 The
court's sole concern became whether the Act properly regulated that right,
74 Id.
75 2 R.I. 561 (1850).
76 Id. at 561.
77 R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17. Cozzens, 2 R.I. at 561. With regard to the provision, the court
in 1850 decided that the provision was not self-executing but "intended to be carried into
effect by legislative regulation." Id. at 563. See also Fernandez, State Constitutions,
Environmental Rights Provisions, and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Question?,
17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 333, 356 (1993).
78 Cozzens, 2 R.I. at 564.
7 Id. Also, there was a benefit in the rent to the State.
'o id. at 565.
8 Id. at 562. The defendant specifically raised a question over whether "the doings of the
commissioner.., are in violation of the principles of the common law." Further, the very
Act under which the defendant was charged was the kind of legislative enactment that
executed art. 1, § 17. Id.
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not whether a traditionally held right of fishery had been diminished
impermissibly.82 The court interpreted the Act to delegate to the Fisheries
Commissioner the conclusive discretion on whether "such oyster bed can be
used more to the public advantage as a private bed under lease than as a
public bed .... in other words, the constitutional right is so regulated as to
reserve to the public the greatest benefit. 83
Thus, restricting or regulating the right of fishery through legislative
enactment would not violate the constitution. The court did not question
whether the legislature had overstepped its constitutional bounds in enacting
an act that restricted a right which Rhode Islanders had historically enjoyed.
It did not provide an analysis to determine whether the Act was an improper
diminution of pre-existing rights guaranteed by the constitution. Rather, the
court simply interpreted the constitutional provision to grant a right of public
benefit from the oyster fishery.
In Providence Gas Co., the court explored the status of the rights that
were reserved under common law. "It is common knowledge that the citizens
of the State have always been accustomed to dig clams freely along the
shores of the bay and river wherever they could be found, and, subject to
some legislative regulations, to fish in the deeper waters."84
The court felt a need to explain that at least two charters for
exclusive-right leases for aquaculture for oysters were granted in 1822 and
1827 by the legislature prior to the adoption of the state constitution in May
1843. The cases that had interpreted the provision prior to and including
Providence Gas Co. in 1910, involved challenges under the state constitution
to the ability of the legislature to regulate public trust property based on
article 1, section 17's statement that "no new right is intended to be granted,
nor any existing right impaired, by this declaration. '85 Since prior to the
enactment of the provision, the legislature had demonstrated the power to
limit the public fishery right by granting exclusive-use charters, no right
existed to be free to pursue the public right unimpeded by legislative
regulation.86 "In other words no change [in rights] was made. 87
This case illustrates that Rhode Island had a clear statement of the
82 Id. at 565.
81 Id. at 564.
84 Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 77 A. 145, 156 (R.I. 1910).
85 R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
86 Providence Gas Co., 77 A. at 158.
87 Id.
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public trust doctrine codified in its constitution. Further, this provision was
the basis for the legislative regulation of the public trust doctrine.
Accordingly, the legislative right to grant farming leases to the submerged
lands was limited by the caveat that the regulation must ultimately provide
for a benefit for a significant portion of the public, not some few private
parties. Cozzens also documents that aquaculture was pursued in Rhode
Island with success for a significant time without having to grant fee simples
to the operators. By merely granting an exclusive license and lease for a
particular use for the benefit of the public, the legislature safeguarded the sea
bed resource, and the rights of the public. Upon a finding that the licensed
activity had consequences overly detrimental to the public trust rights, the
license could be revoked.
An early case attempted to distinguish between those public trust
rights that could be extinguished and those that could not. Carr v.
Carpenter88 involved an action for damages against a defendant who
trespassed onto the beach adjoining plaintiffs property to take stranded
seaweed. The defendant argued that there was a public right to take the
seaweed stranded below the high water mark. 9 The court, agreeing with the
plaintiff, distinguished the right to take seaweed from rights held in trust for
the public by the State such as navigation or fishery.9° The court held that the
taking of seaweed is a private right in the shore which belongs to the adjacent
land's owner, the littoral owner to control and convey.9
The court noted that in Rhode Island, as distinguished from
Massachusetts, the State retains the fee for the land between high and low
water marks.92 However, that fact does not alter the rights of public and
private parties with regards to use of the tidal flats. Among the rights that
attach to the littoral owner, the court included the rights of access to the sea,
to build wharves below the high water mark subject to State regulations to
protect navigation, to "make new land by filling the flats,"93 and the right to
take seaweed, drift-stuff, sand and stones.94 In an interesting portion of dicta,
the court agreed that, at some point, the State may lose to a littoral owner
88 48 A. 805 (R.I. 1901).




93 Id. at 806.
94 Id.
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some control over the rights that may be exercised over the tidal flats. Thus,
while the State could have regulated, limited, withheld, or even taken back
such rights, it should have done so prior to the prescription acquired by the
littoral owner through "long continued usage." 95
In Carr, the court cited with approval to Enmans v. Turnbull,96 where
a littoral owner defended from an assault on a person taking seaweed from
his expanded shoreline by claiming private ownership of the seaweed.97 In
Enmans, the court explained that there are "marine increases arising by slow
degrees," that belong to the littoral owner.98 The axiom has historically been
based on the need to reward the littoral owner for the encroachments of the
sea upon his waterside property: "The rule is that if the marine increase be
by small and almost imperceptible degrees it goes to the owner of the land;
but if it be sudden and considerable, it belongs to the sovereign."99
After reviewing case authority for the adoption of the rule in Rhode
Island, in Carr the court stated that a basis for its refusal to alter the rule is
the likely impact it would have on the values of littoral estates that until then
had been fixed with consideration for the attached property rights.'00 Here is
one of the earliest cases to decide the reach of public trust rights based on
riparian property values. It is interesting that the cost-benefit balance was
carried out by the court absent legislative action. This contrasts with the
approach of the court in Cozzens who stated that the legislature was the
proper body to limit the exercise of public trust rights. Consequently, private
economic impact may be a factor used by the court in deciding whether
public lands could be alienated thereby extinguishing public rights.
A 1910 case delved into the relation between economic impact and
public rights. In re R.I. Suburban Railroad'' determined whether a railroad
could condemn private property for public use. The trial judge decided that
the taking of a private lot to create a power house was "necessary and for a
public use."'2 On appeal, the court explained that whether a particular use
95 Id.
96 2 Johns 313 (N.Y. 1807).
17 Carr, 48 A. at 806.
98 Id.
" Id. (quoting Enmans v. Turnbull, where the court cites from 2 Black. Com. 261 HARG.
LAW TRACTs 28).
100 Id. at 807.
101 48 A. 591 (R.I. 1901).
102 Id. at 591.
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is a "public use is a question of law, to be settled by the court."'' 3 The court
continued that in Rhode Island two types of public uses are recognized-one
is when the State takes property for its own use, and another is when property
is taken "for the use of the public."'0 4  While this case involved the
appropriate legal standard to apply in a condemnation, the construction of
"public use" may be used to illuminate the issues raised in the public trust
cases.
The court explained that "public use" must either be "direct and
obvious" or when a property is committed to "public use" yet it will not be
directly used by the public, the "public" character of the use must itself be a
"direct and obvious" necessity. °5 The court explained that a "public"
character will also be implied when a property is controlled by the State in
order to carry out another public purpose."0 6 Examining the relationship
between economic welfare and public rights, the court stated that "there are
many kinds of business of great benefit to the public generally, which could
not be claimed to warrant a taking of property as for a public use."'0 7 This
reasoning is in conflict with opinions such as Carr and Providence Gas Co.
where the court relied solely on the economic harm to riparian owners or
private business to find a "public purpose." The court concluded by
explaining that as to "public use," the fact that the property's intended use
"will tend incidentally to benefit the public, is not sufficient ... 
B. Harbor Lines
Also called dock lines or wharves lines, harbor lines are a legislatively
set boundary to regulate interference with navigation.'0 9 The establishment
of the harbor line does not expand or diminish property rights, nor does it
automatically equate to a relinquishment by the state of the right to regulate
103 Id.




10 Id. at 593.
109 See GOULD, supra note 23, at 273.
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waters and submerged lands within the harbor line." 0 However, the statutes
setting these lines can have different impacts, based on whether they are
interpreted as implied legislative permission to build to the line or as tacit
acquiescence with such construction."'
In Rhode Island and some other states, however, the statutes and case
law granting riparian owners the license to build to the harbor line do not
divest the state of regulatory power over such submerged lands or waters
within the harbor lines until there has been structure built or the tidal flat
filled." 12
In Gerhard v. The Seekonk River Bridge Comm'rs, 1 3 the court
resolved a claim for damages by tide flats holders for harm caused by the
construction of the Providence to East Providence Bridge over the Seekonk
River. The plaintiffs held the tide flats under leases from the riparian owners.
The court denied compensation, holding in part that the "title to the soil under
tide-water is in the State, and that even the establishment of a harbor line
does not transfer the fee to the riparian owner, but only operates as a license
to him to fill out and incorporate the flats with the upland.""' 4
While the court in Gerhard stated that the license to fill did not
transfer a fee simple to the flats, that license has become the basis for adverse
possession claims against the State. In Bailey v. Burges,"5 Chief Justice
Durfee restated that based on common law, the fee on the submerged land
below the low water mark is with the State. However, riparian owners are
allowed to fill in front of their properties with the permission or acquiescence
from the State. Most important, the establishment of a harbor line became "at
the least equivalent to [the State's] permission expressly given.""' 6 Further,
10 Brown v. Goddard, 13 R.I. 76 (1880); Arborn v. Smith, 12 R.I. 370 (1879); Engs v.
Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875); Attorney General v. Hudson Tunnel R.R., 27 N.J. Eq. 176.
See also GOULD, supra note 23, at 274 n. 1.
. Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence and Stonington Steamship Co., 12 R.I.
348 (1879); Arborn, 12 R.I. 370; People v. N.Y. and Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71
(1877); Bailey v. Burges, 11 R.I. 330 (1876); Engs, 11 R.I. 210; Bay City Gas-Light Co. v.
Industrial Works, 28 Mich. 181 (1873).
12 Arborn, 12 R.I. 370; Engs, I I R.I. 210; Lane v. Harbor Comm'rs, 70 Conn. 685.
113 15 R.I. 334 (1886).
I" Id. at 335. This license becomes the basis for "tacit approval" of the flats and claims
of title by prescription in future cases despite clear prior law that there could not be adverse
possession against the State.
115 11 R.I. 330 (1876).
116 Id. at 331.
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in filling below the high water mark, the riparian owner "will take the land
so filled ... from the State."' 17 Chief Justice Durfee continued the reasoning
in Folsom v. Freeborn, 18 where he stated:
[T]he fee of the soil under tide-water, and within its ordinary
ebb and flow, is in the State. The riparian owners are, or at
least were, until the recent statute, Pub. Laws R.I. cap. 611, §
5, of March 30, 1877, permitted to build and maintain
wharves in front of their land, provided they are so built as
not to impede navigation."1 9
The court also allowed riparian owners to erect structures that "do not
interfere with the public right of navigation, and maintain and enjoy them
against everybody but the State.""'2 I
Thus, the case law establishes that the riparian owner does not take
title to the shoreline or the flats below the high water mark. However, the
owner does obtain rights over the shoreline to exclude the public from the
benefits that wash upon the shore. In addition, the riparian owner, while not
obtaining title to the submerged flats, gains an implied license to fill upon the
setting of the harbor lines.' 2' Further, if the State does not make an
affirmative claim of its rights, the owner may acquire title to the property
created by filling the flats to the harbor line. The cases also demonstrate that
the owners were given the right to erect structures upon the flats to the harbor
line. However, all the cases make clear that the riparian right to erect
wharves upon the flats is limited by the superior public trust right of
navigation.
'' Id. at 332.
018 13 R.I. 200 (1881).
119 Id. at 204.
120 Id. at 205.
12' This acquisition of title is subject, of course, to the limitations imposed by other acts
such as the federal and state clean water acts regulating the filling of wetlands.
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V. THE NEW CASES
A. Nugent
In Nugent v. Vallone, 122 the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of an action by a group of realtors to stop Commerce Oil Refining
Corporation from erecting a 900-foot pier into Narragansett Bay. The pier
was to extend from Jamestown into the east passage of the bay.123 The State
supreme court narrowed the questions on appeal to two. First, whether the
refinery should be permanently enjoined from "interfering with or
encroaching upon public rights in and to the public waters and public lands
adjacent to the area in question." 24 Second, whether the refinery should be
enjoined from "interfering with the riparian rights of the public ... to the
tidewaters and tidelands beyond the high water mark."' 25 Among the asserted
claims, the realtor contended that the oil company's wharf would interfere
with navigation and would "constitute an unlawful appropriation of the
public domain under the waters of the east passage."' 26  Thus, the case
presented a clear opportunity to redefine riparian and public trust rights.
The court acknowledged that while the public has a right of passage
upon the shore itself between the high and low water marks, there was also
a common law riparian right to "wharf-out" which will not be denied unless
such wharfing-out interferes with navigation or the rights of other riparian
22 161 A.2d 802 (R.I. 1960).
123 Id. at 803. The action also sought to restrain the state director of public works from
authorizing or expending any public funds on the construction of the pier. Id.
124 id.
125 Id. at 804. An interesting side issue was created by the fact that, in order to assert
public rights in an equity action, the realtors needed and obtained permission from the State
attorney general. However, the attorney general also filed an answer on behalf of the
director of public works, asserting that there had been no violation of public rights by
approving or funding construction of the pier and that the structure would not be a public
nuisance. This led the court to note, with some discomfort, that "nominally at least the
public appears to be on both sides of the controversy." Id.
126 Id.
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owners.'27 Here, the claim of interference with navigation was resolved,
however, by relying on the Corps of Engineers' certification that the
proposed wharf "would not be a hazard to navigation.""'2 The court also
noted that the State director of public works had previously agreed that the
proposed pier would not interfere with navigation and had approved the
construction plans pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws, section 46-6-2..29
Nugent raises several concerns. The court's reliance on the judgment
of federal and state officials to resolve the issue of interference with
navigation implies that the right of navigation held by the public, and
historically based on the common law, may be defined by legislative
power."0 Consequently, the decision may be interpreted to permit unlimited
legislative restrictions on public trust rights, even extinguishing altogether the
public's right of navigation and fishery. As the case law has developed,
however, the issue is still murky.
Another issue raised in Nugent, the ability of the State to alienate the
soil under waters affected by the doctrine, 3 ' will likely be the most tension-
filled confluence of interests in the State's plan to develop a successful
aquaculture industry. It involves the conflict of public trust rights with
riparian and ownership rights of shoreline owners and the needs of
aquaculture operators. The court concluded that while the common law right
to wharf-out is limited by the public's rights of fishery and navigation, the
State, as trustee, may pursuant to legislative enactment certify that there will
be no interference with publicly held rights and authorize building on to the
127 Id. at 805. One of the earliest cases that detailed the rights and obligations of riparian
owners, Clark v. Peckman, 10 R.I. 35 (1871), made the statement:
[T]hat while the shore itself, and the space between high and low-water
mark is public for passage, the riparian owner has a right of access to the
great hegemony of nations, of which he cannot be deprived, provided the
exercise thereof does not interfere with navigation or the rights of other
riparian owners.
Id. at 38.
12' Nugent, 161 A.2d at 804.
129 Id.
130 This applies even though that power was exercised in Nugent via an administrative
agency.
'31 Nugent, 161 A.2d at 802.
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submerged lands.132
A key concern of the advocates of aquaculture has been the need to
provide assurances to potential entrepreneurs regarding the security of their
investments in aquaculture. Insecurity arises from the possibility that
aquaculture investments may be lost due to claims under public trust or
riparian law in addition to the inherent risks of the enterprise. Since there
would be no land to use as collateral, the operators are likely to mortgage
their homes in order to secure start-up capital. Any additional insecurity is
likely to diminish the already reduced borrowing power of the new operators.
One way to assuage this fear is to provide the putative investors with
assurances that, in return for developing the industry, they will receive a
higher claim of title to the affected properties than that held by the State, the
public, or a riparian owner. To this end, some have sought to vest the
aquaculture developers with fee simple title or very long protected leases. A
prerequisite to this plan, of course, is the State's ability to alienate title to the
submerged lands on which the industry must be based.
In Nugent, the court gave the State the qualified power to alienate the
submerged flats. The court explored the realtors' claim that the statute under
which the State approved the construction was unconstitutional because it
"would be tantamount to giving away the soil under the waters of east
passage which the State holds in trust for the public," in violation of Rhode
Island Constitution article I, section 17, article III, and article IV, sections 1,
2, and 14."'1 This challenge was dismissed as meritless. ' However, the
court explained that while "the State holds title to the soil under the public
waters ... it holds such title not as proprietor but only in trust for the public
to preserve their rights of fishery, navigation and commerce in such
waters."' 35 Thus, the case stands for two propositions regarding the State's
ability to alienate. First, the State holds title to the submerged lands. Second,
the State's power over such title is limited by its trusteeship on the public's
behalf.
"I The State authorities certified that the pier would not interfere with publicly held rights
in accordance with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-6-2 (1956). Although this challenge was brought
prior to the erection of the pier, the court found that if in actual use the wharf interfered with
the public rights, the question would be subject to review based on "the manner in which the
pier is hereafter used." Id. at 806.




PUBLIC TRUST, RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND AQUACULTURE
The scope of the limits imposed on the State by the public's interest
remains unresolved. Nugent provided some of the pieces. The State may
rely on legislative enactments certifying that navigation would not be
significantly impaired to permit some private use of submergedpublic trust
property.136 Also, legislative fiat may declare that a particular use will not
interfere with publicly held rights. Finally, the decision indicates that when
the public's rights of navigation conflicts with other common law rights, such
as the riparian right to wharf out, a balancing test will decide whether the
State is authorizing a proper use for the public trust property. 37
In Hall v. Nascimento,131 the court echoed Nugent's language as to the
control of the State over submerged lands subject to the public trust doctrine.
At issue were lands created when submerged flats were filled. The water
over these flats had been subject to the public trust rights of fishery and
navigation. The court relied on Carr v. Carpenter,"39 to hold that "owners of
land adjoining navigable waters have the right to 'enjoy what remains of the
rights and privileges in the soil beyond their strict boundary lines, after giving
to the public the full enjoyment of their rights.""' 4  The court, however, did
not define "the full enjoyment of [the public's] rights."
By not itemizing the public's rights as they existed at the time of
Carr, the court again left unanswered some of the same questions raised in
Nugent. The court did use Carr, nevertheless, to hold that, by implication,
the riparian owners of the land adjoining the waters retained some rights
beyond the strict boundaries of their lands.' 4'
While the court reaffirmed that submerged lands may be alienated by
legislative act, in Nascimento there was no record of a legislative grant
conveying the land created by the dredge-fill. Thus, the issue became
whether the riparian owners original beach rights could have produced a
136 Id. at 806.
" The factors to be balanced include: on the side of riparian owners, the right of access
to the navigable waters from his lot, the right to make a landing, to erect a wharf for his use
or for public use; on the public side, those rights protected by the public trust doctrine as
modified by legislative regulations to protect fishing, navigation, and commerce. Id. at 805.
138 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991).
139 48 A. 805 (R.I. 1901).
140 Id. at 877.
41 Id. In Nascimento, the riparian owners enjoyed the rights of their predecessors in title
over the shoreline and submerged flats before the new property was created by the Army's
dumping of the fill.
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claim of title to the filled land which had not been transferred by legislative
enactment. The court concluded that the "defendants [could] continue to
maintain rights in that area [the old beach and the newly created shore] as
long as their use of the area is not inconsistent with the public trust.' 2 The
riparian owners did not receive title to the filled land, rather they were
allowed to maintain rights. Title, however, was still held by the State subject
to the public trust doctrine. 143
The decision also addressed the trial court's holding granting title of
the filled land to the riparian owner based on a claim of adverse possession.
The court noted that because the property was publicly owned, adverse
possession was not available, and therefore reversed the trial judge's
finding.' Thus, such property may not be adversely possessed, but may
only be transferred by legislative grant, and when transferred must contain
the limitations necessary in the fee to preserve the public's rights guaranteed
by the doctrine. This conclusion is in keeping with Rhode Island's long
tradition of preventing adverse possession claims against public property. In
Freeborn, the plaintiff asserted a claim of title based on "prescription... by
proof of possession or actual enjoyment."' 45 In response, the court referred
to the claim as "novel and extraordinary ... [placing on the plaintiff the
burden of establishing title] inasmuch as it is in derogation of the public
rights, being to a great extent at least incompatible with them.' 4 6
Nascimento is significant because it acknowledged that regardless of
physical change, property that was once submerged land continues to be
subject to State title and the public trust doctrine. In this way, the decision
limits dicta in Carr to the effect that littoral owners have priority rights to the
use of the shore and submerged lands adjacent to their land. The decision
raised a red flag to all owners of property created by filling-in submerged
142 Id. (emphasis added).
143 Id.
I Id. In Rhode Island, adverse possession of public property is not recognized by statute
and common law. Id.
"' Folsom v. Freeborn, 13 R.I. 200, 205 (1881). The court characterized this claim as an
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land.'47 The ruling put in doubt the status of the title to such properties
through the State being used for private purposes such as marinas by owners
of "adjoining lands." The decision also raised the issue of whether property
owners have to make way for public access to the water. How must they
avoid interfering with other rights inherent in the public trust doctrine?
Perhaps more importantly, it raised the question of who owned the
Providence waterfront.
B. Greater Providence
The riparian owners' concerns finally exploded into litigation in
Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State.148 The decision by
Justice Shea was a declaratory judgment as to the effect of public trust
doctrine on the properties held by plaintiffs, owners of properties on the
Providence Waterfront.'49 These properties were created by filling tidal flats
on Narragansett Bay below the mean high water mark. The properties
consisted of two groups. The first group, the "Cove Lands," were created
from filling the "Great Salt Cove," and were comprised of several hundred
acres in Providence. The filling of the Cove was carried out in the
seventeenth and early eighteenth century. 50 The second group of properties
were labelled by the court as the "Harbor Line" properties.' 5' These parcels
were created by filling below the mean high water mark on the Providence
River between 1857 and 1886, and in 1907, 1909, and 1914, to the harbor
line as it existed in 1879 and 1880.152
The court recognized that the action resulted from the concerns raised
by their earlier decision in Hall v. Nascimento. 53 Justice Shea explained that
Nascimento had been interpreted as subjecting "all land created by placing
of fill below the mean high tide [to the public trust doctrine].' 54 After
14' The concern was sufficient to have caused an. attempt to give riparian owners in Rhode
Island a right of first refusal in any State attempts to alienate public trust property created
by filling in. See Act Relating to Tidal Lands, RS412 (1995).
148 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995).
149 Id. at 1039.
150 Id.
"IJ Id. at 1041.
152 Id.
153 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991).
'14 Greater Providence, 657 A.2d at 1041.
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tracing the origins of the doctrine from Roman law through the American
Revolution,' the court acknowledged that the doctrine is part of every
state's jurisprudence. 56 The court also noted that judicial precedent makes
clear that Rhode Island had embraced "the whole body of general law known
as the public trust doctrine," including the principle "that title to the lands
below the high-water mark vests in the ... [State] as trustee ... for the
public." ' However, the court explained that public trust exists in Rhode
Island "as it has been changed by local legislation or custom."'5
Accordingly, in Rhode Island, the public trust doctrine is based on the
principle that "lands below the high water mark will not be appropriated by,
or conferred upon private individuals for purely private benefit."' 59 This
formulation, however, is to be administered and interpreted "according to
[Rhode Island's] own views of justice and policy ...reserving ...or
granting rights therein to individuals or corporations ...as [the State]
consider[s] for the best interests of the public."'6 °
Based on these principles, the court explored whether the title of the
properties or some particular property rights had been transferred by the State
to the present owners through some form of legislative action. As to some
of the Harbor Line properties, the court could not find records of a legislative
grant or approval. However, the court stated, "[I]t is safe to assume that such
filling would not have been allowed ... without at least the State's tacit
approval, if not its express approval."'' The rest of the Harbor Line
properties were found to have been filled pursuant to permits issued by the
Rhode Island Board of Harbor Commissioners in 1907, 1909, and 1914. As
to these properties, the court decided that ownership had been relinquished
by the State. As to the "Cove Lands," the decision failed to mention whether
or not the filling of the Great Salt Cove was authorized by the State. Instead,
... New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Horgan, 56 A. 179 (R.I. 1903). In addition, while
reviewing the public trust doctrine, the court cited Nugent, 161 A.2d 802, and City of
Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307, 308 (R.I. 1906).
156 Greater Providence, 657 A.2d. at 1042.
"' Id. at 1043 (citing to a body of Rhode Island cases that quote the law from federal and
state sources on the doctrine).
58 Id. at 1042 (citing Comstock, 65 A. 307).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1041. Although this language does not grant a right of prescription, it places an
affirmative burden on the State to preserve its title rights.
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the court explored "whether the public trust doctrine was extinguished in the
Cove Lands by the State's express grant of those lands to the city of
Providence in 1 870. ' '162 In addition, the court considered whether the public
trust interests were extinguished by filling the "Harbor Line" properties in the
absence of express legislative approval. 163 In both instances the court held
that public trust interests in all the created lands were extinguished and the
present owners held in fee simple absolute.
This ruling seems in conflict with the weight of decisions in Rhode
Island that have held that, even in the case of a legislative enactment, public
trust property could only be transferred subject to the rights of the public for
whom the State holds the land in trust. Most problematic, the decision seems
to contradict the court's earlier ruling in Nascimento.
In Greater Providence, the court characterized Nascimento as "a
conflict between public rights and private rights in filled land along the
shore."' According to Greater Providence, Nascimento held that an owner
of property adjacent to the filled land did not have title to the created land
because "any such claims must be based on littoral rights to the tidal lands
that were filled. '165 In Nascimento, the "owners' predecessors in title never
abutted the former high water mark" 16 6 and there was no evidence of a
legislative grant to the owners' predecessors in title, or that there had been an
acquisition of the filled land by deed or adverse possession. 167 Thus, under
Greater Providence, the last case on the subject, a riparian owner may obtain
fee simple title to public trust property that was once submerged tidal land.
Further, the riparian owner's fee may exclude any of the historical public
right uses. In this way, Nascimento drastically changed the doctrine from its
common law form 16 and from Rhode Island's own developed doctrine.
.162 Id. at 1040.
163 Id. at 1041.
164 Id. at 1043.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. This leads to several questions. Would the court find a different level of rights if
the original property abuts the shoreline that is later filled? Just how fact-specific is
Nascimento? The court noted that the property created by the fill could not have been
granted through the fill-permit since the permit only authorized 50 additional feet of
shoreline, yet the Army Corps actually created 260 feet of beach. For this unplanned
property there could not have been a grant of any kind at the time of creation. Accordingly,
title to the new land rested with the State.
161 Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)
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It must be noted that while dealing with land that had been filled for
many years, the Greater Providence decision has the potential to profoundly
impact the public ownership of shoreline and submerged lands. The title that
the Greater Providence owners now hold and that was held to have been in
one way or another, granted by the State, was not a title to the particles of soil
that made up the dumping-this is too rich a legal fiction even for a Rhode
Island court. The title in this instance must be based on the State's ownership
of the previously partially or fully submerged flats that gave the State power
to regulate the waters above them. In other words, the Greater Providence
owners were given fee simple title to a piece of Narragansett Bay bottom that
had been filled up.
The implications of the decision on the development of aquaculture
and on riparian owners' rights and how these two will impact on public trust
rights is significant. If the bay bottom may be alienated, completely
extinguishing public trust rights,169 aquaculture entrepreneurs could be
guaranteed that the submerged land on which their industry is based will not
be retaken by the State or be troubled by trespassing public uses. The
investor security created, however, is at the expense of diminishing the
State's permanent holding of public-trust-resource property, the loss of public
rights on the waters that cover such submerged lands, and possible loss of
control over the future alienation of those lands because of "tacit" permission
to fill.
As to the riparian owner's rights, the decision expanded historical
common law and Rhode Island state law rights. In part, this expansion arises
from the interplay of the right to wharf-out and the concept of tacit
acceptance and permission in Greater Providence allowing the possibility of
reliance-based claims against public lands. Accordingly, the riparian owner
may fill with express or implied permission of the State. As the court stated:
There is nothing in the record to indicate that this filled parcel
of land was filled with the express approval of the state.
However, it is safe to assume that such filling would not have
been allowed to occur in a busy waterway without at least the
... The court stated that "these factors establish that the fee-simple absolute title rests in
the title holders ... subject, of course, to any encumbrances that the title holders may have
placed on the land themselves." Greater Providence, 657 A.2d at 1043-44.
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state's tacit approval. 70
Additionally, the riparian owner may erect structures upon the filled land or
submerged flats in order to wharf-out. And, as against the rest of the public,
the riparian owner may assert a superior right of use and access to the
shoreline. All rights of the riparian owner, however, are subject to the
superior claim of the state, and the limitations imposed by navigation. If a
riparian owner chooses to wharf-out she might be claiming the submerged
property on which her wharf is rooted. At some point, failure of the State to
reassert control over such submerged land may give rise to a claim equivalent
of the owner's claim in Greater Providence-unless, of course, some legal
fiction is erected to distinguish dry from wet-land title. The issue is further
complicated by the court's holding that harbor lines are indicators of
legislative authorization to wharf-out.
The court in Greater Providence noted several factors that
distinguished the land created in that case: as to the Harbor Line properties,
some of the property was filled "to a harbor line with the express approval of
the State;" 171 the approval for the filling of some of the other parcels was
carried out "with the tacit or implied approval of the State;"'172 and the land
had "been substantially improved upon many years."' 73
The court explained the significance of the "harbor line" in public
trust cases involving the filling of land: "The harbor lines were drafted in
cooperation between state and local authorities to establish the point beyond
which fill, wharves and other structures would create an obstruction to
navigation, commerce, and fishery."'' 74 In the case of the "Harbor Line"
properties along the Providence Waterfront, the court saw the harbor lines as
a legislative determination "that encroachment on the waters to the harbor
line would not constitute interference with fishery, commerce, or
navigation.' 1 75 Here the court seems to extend itself in its effort to limit Hall
v. Nascimento, referring to "the limited application that Hall has," implying
170 Id. at 1041.
171 Id. at 1043.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 1044. It is possible, however, that the State was merely willing to allow such
structures subject to a public servitude or to the State's right to reclaim the property for
public use in the future.
175 Id.
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that Nascimento's reasoning may not apply "where no harbor lines are
involved." '176 However, under Greater Providence, once an owner has relied
on the harbor line to fill the flats without interference from the State, the
owner may extinguish even the incidental public rights of access to the water
and the shoreline.177 Thus, the protection of historical rights has been made
dependant on a vigilance that the State is unlikely, if not unable, to maintain.
This rather extreme impact from Greater Providence could be alleviated by
restricting the case to its facts. Specifically, the case could be limited to
properties such as the Providence Waterfront that have been filled and
substantially improved over many years on busy waterways. Such a reading
of the case would prevent future claims of ownership by riparian owners
erecting mere wharves or lesser structures or by uncontrolled filling. An
approach more protective of the public would require that in order to
establish the required adverse claim of the flats, the owner must notify the
State of such intention prior to erecting structures or filling the flats.
Ultimately, the court adopted a two-part test "to establish ownership
rights in filled tidal lands,"'78 to be applied "on a case-by-case basis
according to the facts of each situation." '79 The test provides that two
conditions must be met to obtain "title to [the] land that is free and clear."'80
First, the owner of "littoral" property must have filled along the shoreline
"with the acquiescence or the express or implied approval of the state."''
Second, the owner must build or improve on the created land "in justifiable
reliance, ' 82 of the State's acquiescence or express or implied approval.'83
The title that results may not, under the court's test, be again, taken away by
the State "on the strength of the public trust doctrine alone."'8 4 The court did
leave the State with the ability to restrict the filling of shoreline, but such
restrictions must be adopted before a littoral owner changes her position
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The court also explained in dicta that when it spoke of harbor lines as
"licenses" in Nascimento, it meant that the establishment of the harbor lines
was an invitation or permission by the State to fill to that line. 8 6 The court
cited to several cases for the conclusion that the riparian owner acted properly
when she relied on the establishing of the harbor line as an invitation to fill
and extend the upland, thereby obtaining clear title to the newly created
land.187  But the court did not explain why the owner's reliance is
"justifiable" in light of the "pervasive" and long-standing public trust
doctrine. The statutes setting harbor lines may be presumed to contain a
legislative resolution as to whether building to the line will interfere with
navigation. It is a long analytical jump, however, to conclude that the rights
of the public held in trust by the State have been forfeited; that the State has
given up all property rights in the submerged lands covered within the line;
or that the line eliminates the traditional rights of access to the shoreline as
incidental to the ancient rights of navigation and fishery. 8' Assuming that
the court is correct in interpreting the establishment of the harbor line as a
legislative attempt to alienate this public property, the resulting alienation of
public trust property may be as unconscionable as the grant in Illinois Central
Railroad. In addition, such a legislative act would be impermissible under
the State constitution unless a public purpose is served by the granting of the
property right. The purpose of the line is to regulate navigation, not to
increase the holdings of the shore owners. The protection of navigation can
be accomplished without the State giving up either ownership or control over
the submerged lands or the waters that cover them.
Kayrouz v. R.i Depositors Economic Protection Corp.,'89 illustrates
some of the constraints that the State constitution imposes on the alienation
of public property. At issue was Rhode Island Constitution, article 6, section
1, which states, "The assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each
186 Id.
187 Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 167 (R.I. 1895) (stating that once the land is filled with State
authority or acquiescence, the upland owner takes title from the State); Bailey v. Burges, I I
R.I. 330, 331-32 (1876) ("[E]xtension of the upland to the harbor line extinguishes all public
rights within it."); Clark v. Peckham, 10 R.I. 35, 38 (1871).
188 In Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 77 A. 145 (R.I. 1910), the court stated: "It
is common knowledge that the citizens of the state have always been accustomed to dig
clams freely along the shores of the bay and rivers where they could be found, and subject
to some legislative regulations, to fish in the deeper waters." Id. at 156.
189 593 A.2d 943 (R.I. 1991).
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house of the general assembly shall be required to every bill appropriating the
public money or property for local or private purposes."' 9 °  This
constitutional provision would seem in conflict with the majority view in
Greater Providence that the mere establishing of the harbor line was enough
to convey the submerged land when filled by the private owner. In this case,
the Act in question was passed by a simple majority in each House. 9 ' The
court presented the issue as "whether the purposes for which the General
Assembly enacted the [Act] constitute public purposes and not local or
private purposes."' 92 As in Greater Providence, there were serious private
economic concerns to balance against the public grant. The Act was an
attempt to address the "economic crisis" brought about by the failure of
Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity Corporation.' 93
Kayrouzbegan by noting that "[a] self-serving recitation of a public
purpose.., is not conclusive. ' 94 In this attempt at defining public purpose,
the court analogized the analysis to that of determining public use in
"takings" cases:
[The taking of property for public use] must provide the
general public, or an appreciable portion thereof, with the
right to use or employ such property or at least have it used or
employed by some agency, public or private in the public
interest under appropriate regulations and restriction in order
to provide the public as such with some service deemed to be
necessary to it or to a proper function of government."' 95
90 Id. at 946 (emphasis added).
191 Id.
192 Id.
"I Id The Act included a legislative declaration that "without prompt state legislative
action, there will be a serious negative impact on the health, safety and general welfare of
the people of the state and the economy of the state .... This act shall, therefore, be deemed
to be an exercise of the police powers of this state . I..." d  at 947.
"14 Id. at 947. However, the legislative determination of a public purpose is entitled to
great deference by the judiciary.
"I ld. at 947-48 (citing Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 254 A.2d 426, 431
(1969)). The court continued, however, that the concept of public purpose is not static and
musi change to meet the "ever-changing needs of our complex society." Also, the court
cited to Cranston Redevelopment for support on the need to liberally construe and expand
the meaning of public purpose.
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In this instance, it was enough that the Act was protecting private business
in the State for the court to wave aside the fact that there was no State debt
resulting from the economic crisis, and to conclude that the Act served a
public purpose making its enactment by a simple majority constitutional.19 6
Thus, in Greater Providence, under the Rhode Island Constitution,
the court had two choices: first, decide that the granting of the public land
to the private owners was to avoid economic harm to some private economic
entities, which would have required a two-thirds votes in each house; or
second, determine that the grant was to effect some public purpose. The
court's stated concern was "large amounts of valuable private properties
[becoming] worthless in the real estate market." '197 This private purpose
would require compliance with article 6, section 1. In addition, the existence
of article 6, section 1 militates against the court's conclusion that the State
may by "tacit" approval grant public property 'free and clear" to the private
owners. Also questionable is the role of the court in deciding that protection
of the private economic interests was enough of a "public purpose." As the
court stated in Cranston Redevelopment, while public use must be given a
liberal interpretation to conform with changing needs, the definition of public
interest belongs with "the legislature, not the judiciary ... [as] the guardians
"5198of the public needs ....
Maybe the most troubling aspect of Greater Providence is the court's
basis for drastically altering the doctrine to permit the end of the trusteeship
on a piece of what once was submerged land. The ultimate reasons given by
the court were the need to produce employment through economic
development and concern that economic dislocation would result from
placing a cloud over the sizable holdings that made up the Providence
Waterfront properties. Applying such a cost-benefit analysis has the potential
for immoderate results. It is foreseeable that during economic hard times, or
when the choice is politically controversial, the usual decision will be to
extinguish the public right.
Because the court equated economic development with "for the
benefit of the public," the court elevated economic concerns to the same level
as public rights. This equation is fraught with political controversy specially
"9 Id. at 948. The basis for the conclusion was the adverse economic impact that would
affect numerous depositors and their creditors. Id.
19 Greater Providence, 657 A.2d at 1044 (emphasis added).
98 Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 254 A.2d at 432.
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in an area involving environmental concerns, economic concerns, and
cultural and aesthetic concerns. A danger is that by balancing the diffused
rights of the general public against the concentrated economic rights of a few
powerful private interests, the balance will be inherently tilted to the private
side. This concept was explored by Justice Marshall in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe.'99 Justice Marshall explained that if the use of public
lands was based strictly on a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, those lands
would be used up before private economic interests were denied. In part this
results because the State already owns title, so there is no need to exercise
eminent domain powers or spend public funds, and those lands are almost
always uninhabited and thus less likely to produce political controversy.2"'
While this same concern would arise from a legislative resolution, in the
legislature there is at least the possibility of public political participation, a
factor almost totally absent in a judicial proceeding. This lack of an express
legislative input is especially of concern in light of article 6, section 1 of the
Rhode Island Constitution.
In Greater Providence, the State offered the court the option of
finding that littoral owners who fill and occupy the resulting land be seen as
holding under a "license ... to exclusively occupy the premises ... and that
the public rights in both parcels 'are not self-executing but must await
affirmative legislative action in order to be exercised.""'20 Adopting this
position would have preserved the public rights and given the riparian owner
the assurance that any interference with her private interests would require
action by the legislature. In addition, by requiring the legislature to act to
reclaim the public rights, the court would seem to give the public the
opportunity for political consideration of the policies at stake. Instead, the
court made the policy conclusion that using a license from the State would
make any property "virtually unalienable... [resulting in] large amounts of
valuable private properties [becoming] worthless on the real estate market.
For these reasons alone ... the state must fail."202 Because under the Greater
Providence decision, the State does not retain a reversionary right on these
properties, the natural resource, in this case tidal flats or submerged land, is
diminished and will continue to diminish over time. The diminution of this
199 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
200 Id. at412-13.
20' Greater Providence, 657 A.2d at 1044.
202 Id.
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irreplaceable resource °3 will per force diminish the right itself-the only way
to preserve the right is to conserve the resource on which the right is
exercised.
VI. A DIFFERENT APPROACH
In State v. Central Vt. Ry., 204 the Vermont Supreme Court explained
that the State's approach to control over public property impressed with
public trust rights and offered some limitations on its alienation. At issue
was the ability of the Central Vermont Railway to sell a 1.1 mile strip of
filled land on the shore of Lake Champlain. The land had been filled
pursuant to legislation enacted in 1827 to encourage the building of wharves
by filling the shore and guaranteeing the owners and heirs exclusive benefit
of the use forever (so long as the wharves did not interfere with navigation).
The court ruled that Central Vermont owned the land in "fee simple
impressed with the public trust doctrine. This means that the [Railway] is
free to convey such lands to any other parties ... so long as the land is used
for a public purpose. '2 5 The court also retained jurisdiction to resolve any
questions on whether a "proposed use of the property complies with the
public purpose condition. 20 6
The Vermont Supreme Court quoted:
Historically, no developed western civilization has recognized
absolute rights of private ownership in [submerged] land as a
means of allocating this scarce and precious resource among
the competing public demands. Though private ownership
was permitted in the Dark Ages, neither Roman law nor the
English common law as it developed after the signing of the
Magna Carta would permit it.20 7
As an emphasis on the public interest, the court also noted that Vermont's
203 While, in theory, the State could buy the property back, it is likely that the resource
itself would no longer exist in the same form as when it was granted away.
204 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989).
205 Id. at 1129-30.
206 Id. at 1130.
207 Id. at 1131 (quoting United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 122-23 (D.
Mass. 1981)).
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Constitution provides, "The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in
seasonable times, to hunt and fowl on the lands not inclosed, and in like
manner to fish in all boatable and other waters (not private property) under
proper regulations, to be made and provided by the General Assembly. 20 8
Ultimately relying on Vermont precedent 2 9 the court explained, "This Court
has invoked the public trust doctrine in rejecting claims of private rights with
respect to public waters."210
The court concluded that "the state's power to supervise trust
property in perpetuity is coupled with the ineluctable duty to exercise this
power. '21' It emphasized that a present legislature cannot by conveying trust
property limit the discretion of succeeding legislatures to regulate trust
property for a public purpose as they perceive it. "Every legislature must, at
the time of its existence, exercise the power of the State in the execution of
the trust devolved upon it."'21 2 The exceptions to this bar on alienation of
trust property were "grants of submerged parcels for purposes of aiding
commerce or promoting the public interest and grants of parcels which,
being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining. 21 3
The first exception, rejected in Vermont, does not address what
follows if a grantee later seeks to abandon the public purpose. As to the
second exception, the State argued that an unqualified grant of fee simple
would indeed impair the public interest in the remaining land and waters.
The court, however, avoided this issue by ruling instead that the 1827 statute
did not intend to grant the lands free from public trust. The court concluded
that the legislature meant to preserve the public trust component of the fee
and that the Railway enjoyed a fee simple subject to the "condition
subsequent that the lands be used for railroad, wharf, or storage purposes.
This meant that the State has the right of reentry in the event that the




208 Id (citing VT. CONST. ch. II § 67 (emphasis removed)).
209 Hazen v. Perkins, 105 A. 249 (Vt. 1918).
2 0 Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d at 1131.
2I Id at 1132 (citing to National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658
P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983)).
212 Id. at 1132-33 (citing Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 n.4 (1892)).
213 Id. at 1133.
214 The court relied on Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356
(Mass. 1979).
[Vol. 20:293330
PUBLIC TRUST, RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND AQUACULTURE
The significant difference between the Vermont court and the ruling
in Greater Providence is the limited character of the permissible public uses
of the property held in fee simple by the railroad and the State's ability to
regain the public trust property if it were ever put to a use that was
incompatible with the public's rights. The lower court in the Vermont case
had listed multiple possible public uses including restaurants, hotels, and
shopping malls. The supreme court, however, held that public uses were to
be defined by legislative act. Thus, only those uses in the original legislative
grant were permissible public uses. Otherwise, the legislative control over
public trust properties would have been ceded to the private owner, "and this
legislative control cannot be delegated to others."2 5
By this ruling the Vermont court reserved to the legislature the
important public issue of how and whether to use some or all of a precious
natural resource. The court went further by rejecting a claim of laches and
equitable estoppel, and relying on California case law to hold that the State's
control over public trust property was a continuing one that did not
extinguish because of a grant to one grantee. Further, the State's reserved
power "extends to the revocation of previously granted rights or to the
enforcement of the trust against lands long thought free of the trust."2"6
VII. CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Greater Providence was faced
with alternatives fraught with potentially disruptive economic consequences.
It is possible that this situation led to a decision that, while stabilizing a
significant portion of the State's economic base, may seriously diminish the
rights held in common by the citizens since pre-colonial days. In retrospect,
it might have served the State better if the court had withheld its judgment
and sent the parties to the legislature for a resolution to their problem. Be
that as it may, the court can still limit that case to its historical facts in future
opinions and adopt either a system of State licensing or, like Vermont, the
concept of defeasible fees when ruling on the alienation of public property
thereby preserving the resource on which public trust rights depend.
Otherwise, the court may have opened a sluice through which will ebb a
limited resource on which historical rights are based.
2I State v. Central Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d at 1136.
216 Id (citing National Audubon Soc y, 658 P.2d at 723).
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